

EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT HEGEL BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK HEGEL

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There is no neutral reading of Hegel, no reading which can ignore later interpretations: every “return to Hegel” approaches Hegel’s texts from a tradition foreign to Hegel himself. We have a Kantian transcendental Hegel, a dialectical-materialist Hegel, a Western Marxist Hegel, an existentialist Hegel, a liberal-pragmatist Hegel (Brandom)... Such a multiplicity of readings is not just a secondary phenomenon to be distinguished from the true original. Since a founding figure is by definition not aware of the true dimension of his discovery, a return to this figure is possible only from an external position. The multiplicity of readings should be read in a Hegelian way: it brings out the antagonisms and inconsistencies of the original text itself.

As a Lacanian, my formula is: “everything you wanted to know about Hegel but were afraid to ask Lacan.” Only if we read Hegel through Lacan do we get the key point that Hegel’s Absolute Knowing is his name for the absolute openness of history to contingency. However, also as a Lacanian, I am well aware that, from time to time at least, we should take a close look at Hegel himself, at what he says or writes, literally. My formula is thus also: “Everything you wanted to know about Hegel but were afraid to ask Hegel.” Hegel often says more than he wanted to say, he says things that undermine the predominant image of Hegel as absolute idealist who dissolves all reality in the self-movement of the Idea. Let’s take the first example that comes to my mind: in his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel wrote:

“In extreme danger and in conflict with the rightful property of someone else, this life may claim (as a right, not a mercy) a right of distress /*Notrecht*/, because in such a situation there is on the one hand an infinite injury to a man’s existence.”¹

Can we universalize this “right of distress,” extending it to an entire social class and its acts against the property of another class? Although Hegel does not directly address this question, a positive answer imposes itself from Hegel’s description of “rabble” as a group/class whose exclusion from the domain of social recognition is *systematic*: “Against nature man can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another.”² So we not get here a Hegel justifying class struggle with the *Notrecht*?

Here is another obvious example, a simple but pertinent question raised by Robert Pippin. How can we read Hegel’s detailed description of the rational state in his *Philosophy of Right* together with his well-known statement from the “Preface” to the same book that philosophy always comes too late for a project of how to make our world better:

“Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey on grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.”³

Do these lines not imply that the system of rational state described in the main body of the *Philosophy of Right* is NOT Hegel’s view of how a state should work but a description of the form of a state form already in decay? More precisely, *Philosophy of Right* is not a mere description but a conceptual reconstruction of the Idea of a rational state that was imperfectly actualized in different form of the state in the in-between period between the French Revolution and the full assertion of the bourgeois logic of capitalism also in political life. Hegel’s last published text on the English Reform Bill from 1831 was, as Herbert Marcuse put it, “more a document of the fear and anxiety than that of a reactionary

political philosophy”; what he feared is not elements of liberal democracy present in the Reform Bill but the brutal assertion of the autonomy of bourgeois society outside the stabilizing role of the state – he correctly perceived that “once the dynamism inherent to the bourgeois society had slipped out of the protecting mechanisms of the state, at any moment forces could be released which will shook the system.”⁴

One tries to soften the impact of these lines by claiming that, although Hegel prohibits any visions of how future should be, he nonetheless remains a thinker of progress (the entirety of history is the gradual actualization of the notion of freedom), and makes it clear that every moment of history involves not only its own specific vision of the entire past but also a specific vision of hope, of a possible future, a specific tendency which signals how things should go on. But since every project of hope remains grounded in the present, a true change can only happen if we accept that there is no hope, no place we can escape to, no new continent left for us. When, in *Munich: The Edge of War* (a movie from 2021), someone tries to convince a German diplomat who plans to kill Hitler that violent resistance doesn’t work, and that we should stick to endless negotiations which keep hope alive, the German diplomat replies: »Hoping is waiting for someone else to do it. We’d all be much better off without it.«

One of the ways to avoid this conclusion is to claim that Hegel’s vision of final reconciliation was too early: it is only later that social reconciliation became possible. There are three versions of “Hegel was too early”: first, there was the young Lukacs for whom Hegel’s reconciliation was the idealist prefiguration of the actual reconciliation of subject and substance, the proletarian revolution through which proletariat appropriates the alienated historical substance; then, there was Fukuyama for whom the ideal rational state, the conclusion of world history in which individual freedom is reconciled with organic social order, is not achieved (as Hegel thought) in constitutional monarchy but only in contemporary liberal democracy; finally, there are the AI advocates of neuralink, the so-called transhumanists for whom only the prospect of Singularity opens up actual reconciliation of Spirit and reality.

It seems evident to me that these three versions are not only in themselves wrong – they avoid the central paradox of Hegel’s notion of

reconciliation. If for Hegel future is radically open, how can he claim that the power of Spirit can make our deeds “as if they had never happened”: “The wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind.”⁵ For Hegel, wounds are healed in a much stronger sense than just as steps towards a higher unity: they literally disappear, they are “undone”— how? Recall Wagner’s “Die Wunde schliesst der Speer nur der Sie schlug” from the finale of *Parsifal* — Hegel says the same thing, although with the accent shifted in the opposite direction: the wound is self-inflicted, the Spirit is itself the wound it tries to heal. That is to say, what is “Spirit” at its most elementary? The “wound” of nature: subject is the immense—absolute—power of negativity, of introducing a gap or cut into the given-immediate substantial unity, the power of differentiating, of “abstracting,” of tearing apart and treating as self-standing what in reality is part of an organic unity. Consequently, the Spirit heals its wound not by directly healing it, but by getting rid of the very full and sane Body into which the wound was cut. It is in this precise sense that, according to Hegel, “the wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind”: Hegel’s point is not that the Spirit heals its wounds so perfectly that, in a magic gesture of retroactive sublation, even their scars disappear; the point is rather that, in the course of a dialectical process, a shift of perspective occurs which makes the wound itself appear as its opposite—the wound itself is its own healing when perceived from another standpoint. Here is the key passage from Hegel’s small logic:

“In the sphere of the finite we can neither experience nor see that the purpose is genuinely attained. The accomplishing of the infinite purpose consists therefore only in sublating (*Aufhebung*) the illusion that it has not yet been accomplished. The good, the absolute good, fulfills itself eternally in the world, and the result is that it is already fulfilled in and for itself, and does not need to wait upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in which we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that is the activating element upon which our interest in the world rests.”⁶

My reading of these lines is that Hegel doesn’t go to the end here: he ignores the fact that the illusion is redoubled. The illusion is not only that the absolute needs to wait upon us for the reconciliation to happen; the illusion is also the idea that the sphere of the finite in which we think that the goal is fulfilled only through our work is an illusion and that the goal is always-already fulfilled. The infinite absolute is not somewhere beyond

our finite sphere of illusions, it is kept alive only through the activating element of our finite engagement. As Lacan put it, *la vérité surgit de la méprise*, which means that, in some unheard-of sense, finite subjects produce and sustain eternity, the eternal order which is always-already here. Eternity is itself a historical category, it changes with each historical epoch.

Hegel's basic insight is that what happens in a reconciliation is just a shift of perspective: we realize that what we were awaiting is already here. In authentic Christianity, we do not wait for the second coming as an event in the future when Christ will appear again among us – we realize that the Holy Spirit, the community of believers, already is the second coming. Frederic Jameson read in a similar way *Antigone*: it is not a play about the crisis of the Greek polis, about the disintegration of its organic unity, but, on the contrary, a play about the emergence of a state through the division between the private family sphere and the public sphere of the state. What Hegel calls "reconciliation" is not a reduction of the traumatic excess to a gapless totality but the acceptance of this excess in its meaningless brutality. So it is precisely because of this notion of reconciliation that the future of human history is impenetrable: each vision of the future, each tendency (good or bad) inscribed into a particular situation, is limited by this situation itself, and it is this entire situation which is transformed in a real change.

This is why, when a radical change occurs, things necessarily go wrong – the very situation which gave birth to a vision of the future disappears. This is the Hegelian view of the entirety of modern history: French Revolution had to end in terror, the peaceful progress of the second half of the nineteenth century was cut short with the carnage of the Great War, the authentic emancipatory potential of the October Revolution gave birth to Stalinism, and the Fukuyamaist dream of the end of history turned into the mess we are in now. We are acting now in the absence of full knowledge of the world; in the uncertainty of an undetermined future that can't be known, and this uncertainty does not reside only in the limitation of our knowledge, it is inscribed into reality itself. The true meaning of what goes on now will only emerge *post factum*. Hegel here agrees with his great opponent Kierkegaard who pithily summed up the existential condition of humanity: "Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards."⁷

So I think we should turn around Robert Brandom's motif of the "spirit of trust" - is the deepest feature of a true Hegelian approach not a spirit of *distrust*? Hegel's basic axiom is not that the teleological premise that, no matter how terrible an event is, at the end it will turn out to be a subordinated moment that contributes to the overall harmony - an extreme case are here Jews who see Shoah as a divine reminder God sent to the Jews that it's time to return to their homeland. Hegel's axiom is that no matter how well planned and meant an idea or a project is, it will somehow turn wrong: the Greek organic community of a polis turns into a fraternal war, the medieval fidelity based on honor turns into empty flattery, the revolutionary striving for universal freedom turns into terror... Hegel's point is not that this bad turn could have been avoided (say, if only the French revolutionaries were to constrain themselves to realize concrete freedom of an organic social order of estates and not the abstract freedom-equality of all, the bloodshed could have been prevented) - we have to accept that there is no direct path to concrete freedom. "Reconciliation" resides just in the fact that we resign ourselves to the permanent threat of destruction which is a ground of our freedom, from the threat of madness which always lurks behind the exercise of reason to the threat of war which elevates individuals from their immersion into particular interests to actual universality. As Hegel puts it, in reconciliation we "recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present," where "cross" is to be read in the sense of having a "cross to bear," of dealing with a heavy burden, trouble, or misery.

So what if we try to imagine a progress which goes further, towards a post-Hegelian parliamentary liberal democracy? It would have been easy for Hegel to point out how the unheard-of carnage of the Great War emerged as the truth of the 19th century gradual peaceful progress. It is easy to imagine the glee with which Hegel would have analyzed the immanent logic of how a liberal society leads to Fascism, or how a radical emancipatory project of October revolution ends up in Stalinism, or how the triumph of global capitalism in 1990 paved the way for the populist New Right... to analyze THIS is the task of us, Hegelians, today.

Hegel's pages on Beautiful Soul in his *Phenomenology* reverberate as an uncanny in-advance-critique of Political Correctness – just recall his claim that moral judgment is "envy which helps itself to the cloak of morality". So I can easily imagine Hegel having an intellectual orgasm in

bringing out the (for him) obvious necessity of the reversal of inclusivity and diversity into a procedure of systematic exclusion: you argue for diversity and inclusion, but you do it by excluding all those who do not fully subscribe to your own definition of diversity and exclusion - so all you do is permanently exclude people and stances. In this way the struggle for inclusion and diversity gives birth to an atmosphere of Stasi-like suspicion and denunciation where you never know when a private remark of yours will lead to your elimination from the public space... Don't we get here an extreme version of the joke about eating the last cannibal? "There are no opponents of diversity and inclusion in our group – we've just excluded the last one..." Such inversion of inclusion into exclusion also obeys a deep Hegelian dialectical reversal, namely the transposition of an external threat into immanent antagonism, as it was perspicuously noted by Jon Elster apropos the notion, fashionable today, of democracy under threat: "We can reverse the common dictum that democracy is under threat, and affirm that democracy *is* the threat, at least in its short-termist populist form."⁸ Exactly as in the case of Cancel Culture, the threat to inclusion and diversity are inclusion and diversity themselves when they are practiced in a way that shows/displays extreme exclusion. A similar procedure should be applied also to the big opponents of Cancel Culture. In one of Trump's latest speeches, there is a passage which quite literally and in popular terms reproduces the paradox of superego and surplus-enjoyment:

"Our country is winning again. In fact, we're winning so much that we really don't know what to do about it. People are asking me, please, please, please, Mr. President, we're winning too much. We can't take it anymore. We're not used to winning in our country until you came along, we're just always losing. But now we're winning too much. And I say, no, no, no, you're going to win again. You're going to win big. You're going to win bigger than ever."

Otto von Bismarck said: „Stupidity is a gift from God, but it should not be abused.“ Trump regularly abuses his stupidity, but in the quoted passage he uses it properly. To prove this, let's quote a full sentence from *Philosophy of Right*: "To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present *and thereby to enjoy the present*, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual." The enigmatic words are "to enjoy the present" - how can we enjoy the cross of the present? This is what

Trump indicates - his message is: 'Americans, don't be ashamed of winning too much! You must *enjoy* the pain of winning beyond the pleasure principle!' Trump acts like the obscene superego father who oppresses the people, his subjects, with the constant pressure to enjoy more, to never relax and accept a comfortable stable life. The contrast between Trump and a classic oppressive leader is clear here: a classic Leader would tell us "Enough of your pleasure, of your easy daily life – it's time for great sacrifices, even for risking your life! Duty calls!", while Trump demands exactly the same, just in the opposite form which makes it much more oppressive: "Not only you have to do your duty, you have to enjoy it!" He is not simply lying: the surplus-enjoyment he offers is the enjoyment in torturing and humiliating the other... Trump quite literally formulates the oppressive, negative, dimension of surplus enjoyment: "no, no, no, you're going to win again" - the external opposition (pleasure-pain) is transposed into an internal opposition between pleasure and its excess.

However, it is obvious that such a critique cannot go on indefinitely - how are we to confront properly today's threat of a (social or environmental) catastrophe? Jean-Pierre Dupuy proposed that we need to break out of the »historical« notion of temporality - we have to introduce a new notion of time:

"The catastrophic event is inscribed into the future as a destiny, for sure, but also as a contingent accident: it could not have taken place, even if, in *futur anterieur*, it appears as necessary. /.../ if an outstanding event takes place, it could not not have taken place; nonetheless, insofar as it did not take place, it is not inevitable. It is thus the event's actualization – the fact that it takes place – which retroactively creates its necessity."⁹

Dupuy recalls here the French presidential elections in May 1995 - the forecast of the main polling institute: "If, on next May 8, Ms Balladur will be elected, one can say that the presidential election was decided before it even took place." If – accidentally - an event takes place, it creates the preceding chain which makes it appear inevitable: THIS, not the common places on how the underlying necessity expresses itself in and through the accidental play of appearances, is *in nuce* the Hegelian dialectics of contingency and necessity. And this is also how we should approach the ecological crisis: not to "realistically" appraise the possibilities of the

catastrophe, but to accept it as Destiny: like the election of Balladur, if the catastrophe will happen, one can say that its occurrence was decided before it even took place. Destiny and free action thus go hand in hand: freedom is at its most radical the freedom to change one's Destiny.

What this means is that, more even than Heidegger, Hegel is the thinker of radical finitude - Hegel's name for the radical finitude of our predicament is none other than Absolute Knowing.¹⁰ Hegel's claim is not just that we can only fully know the past, but a much more radical one: each historical epoch implies its own vision of the past, it reconstructs it retroactively from its standpoint. This is what Hegel calls "Absolute Knowing /*Wissen*, not *Erkenntniss*/cognition/": the end-point of dialectical reversals when the subject stumbles upon the final limitation, the limitation as such, a limitation which can no longer be inverted into a productive self-assertion.

Hegel is thus more materialist than Marx: Marx's vision of history remains teleological, proletariat (his privileged historical subject) knows where history is moving (towards Communism that will resolve its antagonisms) and can act accordingly, while Hegel excludes the possibility of a historical subject who has objective knowledge about where history is moving and can act accordingly. Lacan was right when he pointed out that the idea of progressive evolution is a new form of teleology. The only way to break from teleology is to adopt a top-down reading of history which conceives linear progress as a retroactive fact, as the outcome of a backwards-projection of our standpoint into the past. Marx at his best was aware of this - in the introduction to *Grundrisse*, Marx wrote:

"Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known."¹¹

There is no teleology here, the effect of teleology is strictly retroactive: *once capitalism is here* (emerging in a wholly contingent way), it provides the key for understanding all other previous formations. Teleology resides precisely in evolutionary progressivism where the key to the anatomy of man is the anatomy of ape. In a holographic, top-down history, the key to the anatomy of the ape is the anatomy of man which it

anticipates. This logic of retroactive necessity is also present in Kant's ethical thought. Kant wrote that, in some sense, the world was created so that we can fight our moral struggles in it: when we are in the midst of an intense struggle which means everything to us, we experience it as if the whole world could collapse if we fail. When Benjamin wrote that a big revolutionary battle decides not only the fate of the present but also of all past failed struggles, he mobilizes the same retroactive mechanism epitomized by religious claims that, in a crucial battle, not only the fate of mortals but the fate of God himself is decided.

What does this mean for us today, with regard to the threat of a global catastrophe? Recall Antonio Gramsci's remark from his *Prison Notebooks*: "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid phenomena [*fenomeni morbos*] appear." Everybody from the Right to the Left uses this claim to characterize our situation. For the Left liberals, the morbid phenomenon is the rise of new populist Fascism, and for the new Right, it is the excess of Woke culture (open gates to immigrants, support of transsexuality...). But I think we should make a step further here: Gramsci still thinks within the classic Marxist frame of transition from capitalism to socialism, and "morbid phenomena" arise when this transition gets stuck – say, we got Stalinism because the first Communist revolution occurred in a wrong place, Russia with its Asiatic traditions. So we remain within the same linear progress, there are just delays and detours.

We have to abandon this Marxist frame. Many social analysts noticed how today capitalism (as we knew it) is disintegrating, but without any "higher" stage at the horizon: capitalism is *just disintegrating*, entering a new stage for which we are still searching a new name (like techno-feudalism or new fascism) and which is, if anything, much darker than the old "global capitalism." As Wolfgang Streeck put it, Marxism was right about the "final crisis" of capitalism, we are clearly entering it today, but this crisis is just that, a prolonged process of decay and disintegration, with no easy Hegelian *Aufhebung* in sight, no agent to give to this decay a positive twist and transform it into the passage to some higher form of social organization.

The “normal” process of our history runs towards (different forms of) a final catastrophe, a self-destruction through ecological collapse, through the uncontrolled reign of Artificial Intelligence, through global wars – *these endpoints of our history are the true morbid phenomena*. In such a predicament, we should pull the emergency brake on our historical process, or, to quote Walter Benjamin from his “Theses on History”: »Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on this train – namely, the human race – to activate the emergency brake.« The model Leftist actions today are desperate attempts to stop the destruction of our environment, to control the explosive development of Artificial Intelligence, to prevent a new world war. Maybe, the time has come to turn around Marx’s thesis 11: in the XXth century, we tried to change the world without really understanding it; now it’s the time to interpret it.

What we are approaching now is nothing less than the end of the world. The shortest definition of the end of the world is: it doesn’t change only local events within a situation, it changes the coordinates of the situation itself. Let me paraphrase here an old joke from the GDR: Ursula von der Leyen, Putin and Trump meet god and each is allowed to ask him a question. Von der Leyen begins: “Tell me what will happen to European Union in the next decades?” God answers: “It will fall apart as a union and become a popular spot for tourists under Russian domination,” Von der Leyen turns around and starts to cry. Then Putin asks god: “Great – so what will happen with my beloved Russia?” God answers: “It will be a province of China.” Putin turns around and starts to cry. Finally, Trump asks: “And what will be the fate of the US after a decade of MAGA rule?” God turns around and starts to cry... In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel called such a reversal an *experience* of consciousness, a transformative experience comparable to a religious conversion. On a path to truth (how things really are), we repetitively experience a gap between how things really are and how they appear to us. In an experience proper, we don’t just abandon our perception of a thing and replace it with a more appropriate one – together with a change of our perception, the thing itself changes. Therein resides the difference between doubt – *Zweifel* – and despair – *Verzweiflung*: an authentic experience is

much more than a simple doubt; in it, we go through despair because we lose the very standard of how we judge things, our ground is taken from us. And this happens in the joke I've just quoted: not just we, god himself – the objective measure of things - turns around and cries. The only point in modern science that something similar happens is quantum mechanics which compels us to change our notion of reality itself and abandon the determinist realism that predominated in natural sciences.

This is where we are today. It is not enough to criticize the new barbarism that is exploding all around us. We have to critically question the very notions on which we rely in criticizing our predicament: what is nature after the collapse of our environment? What is being human after we are caught in artificial intelligence?

But can we already think AI? Recall the already-quoted Hegel's claim that philosophy can grasp a social form only when this form is already in its decay. Since AI is obviously still ascending, with its potentials not yet clearly displayed, does this mean that philosophy should better keep silent because it is not yet in a position to really grasp it? There is another option available here – to apply to AI the stance of Pascal to modern scientific image of the universe. Pascal was far from uncritically endorsing the emerging modern scientific universe; his interest was exactly the opposite one, how can in these new conditions the pre-modern Christian faith survive, how it should be reformulated - precisely in this way, Pascal was able to understand the radical novelty of the modern universe much clearly than its direct naïve supporters.

Today, however, a turn to a religious messianic vision of the future no longer works. Marx's well-known characterization of religion as the "opium of the people" remains all too naïve. It is true that radical Islam is an exemplary case of religion as the opium of the people: a false confrontation with capitalist modernity which allows the Muslims to dwell in their ideological dream while their countries are ravaged by the effects of global capitalism – and exactly the same holds for Christian fundamentalism. However, in our Western world there are two other versions of the opium of the people: the opium and the people. The reference to »people« functions today as a fuzzy populist dream destined to obfuscate our own antagonisms. And for many among us the

opium of the people is opium itself, escape into drugs. Large aspects of our lives are regulated drugs, from everyday use of sleeping pills and anti-depressants to hard narcotics - our very emotions are “outsourced” to chemical stimulation.

So my idea is that a Hegelian look at AI allow us to better to grasp what AI is than a direct look at it of its partisans; plus it allows us to clarify also the opposite question: what, in view of AI, does it mean to be a subject and/or a human? How does AI compel us to change our notion of a human subject? Thinking is needed here, a thinking which is neither comprehension nor knowledge. Knowledge doesn't think, it just knows what it knows, while comprehension is the reduction of what we know to our already-given historical world of meaning – to “comprehend” something means to reduce it (or translate it) to our world of meaning. It is in this sense that Richard Feynman said decades ago that nobody can understand quantum physics: it cannot be translated into our ordinary experience of reality. And I think the same holds for AI: to grasp its effective functioning and its implications, thinking is needed, a new thinking which changes the basic coordinates of our experience.

Alain Badiou begins his *True Life* with a provocative claim: from Socrates onward, the function of philosophy is to *corrupt the youth*, to extricate them from the predominant ideologico-political order. Already during his life, Hegel was perceived as a corruptor of the youth. Such ‘corruption’ is needed most urgently today, in our liberal-permissive West where most people are even not aware of the way the establishment controls them precisely when they appear to be free – the most dangerous unfreedom is the unfreedom that we experience as freedom, or, as Goethe put it two centuries ago: “None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.” If the XXth century was Marxist, the XXIst century will be Hegelian... or we will disappear as humans.

¹ Quoted from <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm>

² Op.cit.

³ Op.cit.

⁴ Marcuse quoted from

<http://globalphilosophy.hu/regioldal/tudasszociologia/20121027133125895000000773.html>.

⁵ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 667 and 669.

⁶ Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, paragraph 212.

⁷ <https://www.noemamag.com/quantum-existentialism/>.

⁸ Jon Elster, ‘Some Notes on “Populism”’, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 46, no. 4 (2020).

⁹ Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *Petite métaphysique des tsunamis*, Paris: Seuil 2005, p. 19.

¹⁰ I resume here the line of argumentation from the subchapter “Absolute Knowing” of the Chapter 6 of my *Less Than Nothing*, London: Verso Books 2012.

¹¹ Quoted from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3>.